Micromanaging Technology
Abstract
To what extent can the state control technological development? Companies are being suspected of overcomplicating products to extract more profit, not to add value for consumers, which I call complexity profiteering. For example, cars do not have to be connected to the internet, but connecting cars to the internet enables firms to remotely lock features so they can be sold for recurring fees. Bans of specific features that firms could profiteer from, which I call complexity prohibitions, are gaining public support as a solution to suspected predatory design practices. Is BMW trying to sell heated seats for monthly fees? The law can ban the practice. Is Apple putting serial numbers on iPhone batteries so that only Apple can replace them, thereby incentivizing consumers to buy a new phone when a new battery would suffice? The law can ban Apple from putting serial numbers on batteries, and require Apple to provide for free any tools needed to replace batteries.
I argue that complexity prohibitions can reduce state control over technology, thereby exacerbating the predatory design practices they aim to mitigate. In the short run, complexity prohibitions are easily circumvented because banning one complexity merely causes firms to exploit another. Mercedes-Benz responded to proposed bans on the sale of heated seats for monthly fees by selling faster acceleration for monthly fees. In the long run, as the law bans each new complexity that firms exploit and firms circumvent each ban by finding new exploitable complexities, this whack-a-mole would lead to design micromanagement, which would complicate product design and defeat the point of complexity prohibitions: to eliminate complexities that firms profiteer from. Replacing the iPhone 16’s battery requires 20 tools, four of which Apple sells for $115, $190, $216, and $256.35, respectively.
As an alternative to complexity prohibitions, I propose a way to inform consumers so they can vote with their wallets against products suspected of complexity profiteering. I conclude by proposing a paradigm shift in tech law toward a pragmatic approach which accepts that indirect, market-based solutions may, in at least some instances, provide more control over technology than direct regulation would.
